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We study the interplay between evolutionary game and network structure and show how the
dynamics of the game affect the growth pattern of the network and how the evolution of the network
influence the cooperative behavior in the game. Simulation results show that the payoff-based
preferential attachment mechanism leads to the emergence of a scale-free structural property, P (k) ∼
k−γ . Moreover, we investigate the average path length and the assortative mixing features. The
obtained results indicate that the network has small-world and positive assortative behaviors, which
are consistent with the observations of some real social networks. In parallel, we found that the
evolution of the underlying network structure effectively promotes the cooperation level of the
game. We also investigate the wealth distribution obtained by our model, which is consistent with
the Pareto law in the real observation. In addition, the analysis of the generated scale-free network
structure is provided for better understanding the evolutionary dynamics of our model.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 02.50.Le, 89.65.-s, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a useful framework for describ-
ing the evolution of systems consisting of selfish individ-
uals [1, 2, 3]. The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) as a
metaphor for investigating the evolution of cooperation
has drawn considerable attention [4, 5]. In the PDG,
two players simultaneously choose whether to cooperate
or defect. Mutual cooperation results in payoff R for
both players, whereas mutual defection leads to payoff
P gained both. If one cooperates while the other de-
fects, the defector gains the highest payoff T , while the
cooperator bears a cost S. This thus gives a simply rank
of four payoff values: T > R > P > S. One can see
that in the PDG, it is best to defect regardless of the
co-player’s decision to gain the highest payoff T . How-
ever, besides the widely observed selfish behavior, many
natural species and human being show the altruism that
individuals bear cost to benefit others. These observa-
tion brings difficulties in evaluating the fitness payoffs
for different behavioral patterns, even challenge the rank
of payoffs in the PDG. Since it is not suitable to con-
sider the PDG as the sole model to discuss cooperative
behavior, the snowdrift game (SG) has been proposed as
possible alternative to the PDG, as pointed out in Ref
[6]. The main difference between the PDG and the SG
is in the order of P and S, as T > R > S > P in
the SG. This game, equivalent to the hawk-dove game,
is also of much biological interest [7, 8]. However, the
original PDG and SG cannot satisfyingly reproduce the
widely observed cooperative behavior in nature and so-
ciety. This thus motivates numerous extensions of the
original model to better mimic the evolution of coopera-
∗Electronic address: gchen@ee.cityu.edu.hk
tion in the real world [9, 10, 11, 12].
Since the spatial structure is introduced into the evolu-
tionary games by Nowak and May [13], there has been a
continuous effort on exploring effects of spatial structures
on the cooperation [6, 14, 15]. It has been found that the
spatial structure promotes evolution of cooperation in the
PDG [13], while in contrast often inhibits cooperative be-
havior in the SG [6]. In recent years, extensive studies
indicate that many real networks are far different from
regular lattices, instead, show small-world and scale-free
topological properties. Hence, it is naturally to consider
evolutionary games on networks with these kinds of prop-
erties [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. An interesting result
found by Santos and Pacheco is that “Scale-free net-
works provide a unifying framework for the emergence
of cooperation” [23]. So far, most studies of evolutionary
games over networks are based on static network struc-
ture. However, it has been pointed out that the network
structure may coevolve with the game [24, 25, 26, 27, 28],
where each individual would choose its co-players to gain
more benefits, inducing the evolution of their relationship
network. Some previous works about weighted networks
suggest that it is indeed the traffic increment spurs the
evolution of the network to maintain the system’s normal
and efficient functioning [29, 30]. From this perspective,
in the present paper we propose an evolutionary model
with respect to the interplay between the evolutions of
the game and the network for characterizing the dynam-
ics of some social and economic systems.
In our model, the SG is adopted for its more general
representation of the realism and evolutionary coopera-
tive behavior. Since growth is a common feature among
networked systems [31], we assume that the network con-
tinuously grows by adding new agents to the existent
network on the basis of the payoff preferential attach-
ment. We focus on the evolution of the network structure
together with the emergence and persistence of coopera-
2tion. Simulation results show that the obtained networks
follow a power-law distribution, p(k) ∼ k−γ , with expo-
nent γ tuned by a model parameter. The average dis-
tance of the network scales logarithmically with the net-
work size, which indicates the network has a small-world
effect. Interestingly, the assortative mixing properties
generated by our model demonstrate that the model can
well mimic social networks. In parallel, with the exten-
sion of the network, the density of cooperators increases
and approaches a stable value, which gives a new expla-
nation for the emergence and persistence of cooperation.
We also explore the wealth distribution, where the so-
called wealth is the accumulated payoff distribution of
each individual. The Pareto law is well reproduced by
our model. At last, we provide analyses for the obtained
scale-free network structures.
The paper is arranged as follows. In the following sec-
tion, we describe the model in detail, in Sec. III, simu-
lation results and correspondent analytical ones are pro-
vided, and in Sec. IV, the work is concluded.
II. THE MODEL
Let us introduce briefly the SG first. Consider two
drivers are trapped in two side of a snowdrift. Each driver
has two possible selections, either shoving the snowdrift
(cooperator-C) or remaining in the car and do nothing
(defect-D). If both cooperate, they could be back home
on time, so that each will gain a reward of b, whereas
mutual defection results in still blocked by the snowdrift
and each gets a payoff P = 0. If only one driver shovels
(takes C), then both drivers can be back home. The
driver taking D gets home with do nothing and hence
gets a payoff T = b, while the driver taking C gains a
“sucker” payoff of S = b − c. Thus, the rank of four
payoff values is T > R > S > P . Following common
practice, the SG is rescaled with R = 1, T = 1 + r and
S = 1−r, where r is a tunable parameter ranging from 0
to 1. Hence, the payoffs can be characterized by a single
parameter for convenient study.
Our model starts from m0 nodes randomly connected
with probability p, each of which represents a player (In
the following, we fixm0 = 10, p = 0.6 and examine that it
has no influence on our results in present work). Initially,
the nodes are randomly assigned to be either strategy C
or D with 50− 50 percentages. Players interact with all
their neighbors simultaneously and get payoffs according
to the preset payoff parameter. The total payoff of a cer-
tain player is the sum over all its encounters. Then, every
node i randomly selects a neighbor j at the same time
for possible updating its strategy. The probability that i
follows the strategy of the selected node j is determined
by the total payoff difference between them, i.e.,
pij =
1
1 + exp[(Mi −Mj)/T ]
, (1)
where Mi and Mj are the total payoffs of i and j at the
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FIG. 1: (color online). Degree distributions and relevant
cumulative degree distributions for different values of W are
shown in the top panel and the bottom, respectively. The
network size N is 10000. Each distribution is obtained by
averaging over 10 distinct simulation. The degree distribution
is nearly independent of r.
moment of the encounter. Here, T characterizes “noise”,
including bounded rationality, individual trials, errors in
decision, etc. It should be noted that T here plays a
different role comparing with the cases of adopting the
normalized payoff difference. In parallel, T does not play
the same role for different network sizes [32, 33, 34, 35].
Since in our model, the network size gradually grows, it is
not easy to keep the effect of T unchanged at every time
step. For simplicity, we fix T to 0.1 during the evolution
of the network.
Here, we adopt the synchronous updating rule. After
each step that players update their strategies, a new in-
dividual is added into the network with m ≤ m0 (we fix
m = 3 for convenience) links preferentially attached to
existent nodes of higher payoffs, i.e.,
Πnew→i =
Mi +W∑
j(Mj +W )
, (2)
where Mi and Mj are the total payoffs of i and j ob-
tained in the interaction process. W is a tunable param-
eter, which reflects the original payoff values of players
when they join into the game system. For simplicity,
we set W be a constant. The payoff-based preferential
selection takes into account the “rich gets richer” char-
acteristic and couples the dynamics of the evolutionary
game and the evolution of the underlying network. After
a new player joins into the network, the new one ran-
domly choose strategy C or D and all old players preserve
their strategies for the game in the next round. Then,
repeat the above procedures, and the network size grad-
ually grows.
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FIG. 2: (color online). Average distance 〈L〉 as a function
of network size N . Each data point is obtained by averaging
over 10 network realizations. These results are independent
of parameter r.
III. SIMULATION AND ANALYTICAL
RESULTS
A. The evolution of networks
Numerical simulations are performed to quantify the
structural properties of the obtained networks. In Figure
1, we show the degree distribution and correspondent cu-
mulative degree distribution P (≥ k), in networks of size
N = 10000. The distributions clearly exhibit power-law
behaviors, P (k) ∼ k−γ , in a broad range of degrees with
a fat tail for very large degrees. Besides, for the cumu-
lative degree distribution P (≥ k), a cut-off at very large
degrees is observed for each distribution, which corre-
sponds to the fat tail range. The cumulative degree dis-
tribution provides a clear picture of the power-law behav-
ior. These results indicate that the empirically observed
scale-free structure can be generated from the coupling
of the game and the evolution of the network, which may
be an explanation for the heterogenous structure of many
social and economical networked-systems. Moreover, the
exponent γ is a function of W , which makes our model
more general for mimicking a variety of real networks.
We have checked that the parameter r has slight effect
on γ, while W plays a major role. Analytical results of
the power-law distribution will be given after the discus-
sion of the correlation between individuals’s payoffs and
the degrees of nodes occupied by them.
Average path length is a key measure for quantifying
the small-world effect, which is widely observed in the
real world [36]. The average path length 〈L〉 of a network
is defined as
〈L〉 =
2
N(N + 1)
∑
i≥j
dij , (3)
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FIG. 3: (color online). Assortative mixing coefficient A as a
function of parameter r for different values ofW . The network
size N is 10000. Each data point is obtained by averaging over
10 network realizations.
where dij is the shortest path length from node i to node
j, and N is the network size. We perform simulations on
〈L〉 as a function of network size for different values of
parameter W . Each data point is obtained by averaging
over 10 different network realizations. Figure 2 shows
that for all the values of W , 〈L〉 increases logarithmi-
cally with the growth of the network, but the slopes for
differentW show slight differences. These results demon-
strate that the small-world effect can be reproduced by
the proposed model.
Another important structural feature useful for mea-
suring the correlation among nodes of a network is the
assortative mixing coefficient A, or called degree-degree
correlation [37, 38], which is defined as follows:
A =
M−1
∑
i jiki − [M
−1
∑
i
1
2 (ji + ki)]
2
M−1
∑
i
1
2 (j
2
i + k
2
i )− [M
−1
∑
i
1
2 (ji + ki)]
2
, (4)
where ji and ki are the degrees of the two nodes at the
end of the ith edge, with i = 1, · · · ,M (M is the to-
tal number of edges of the observed graph). Two main
classes of possible correlations have been observed in the
real world: assortative behavior if A > 0, which indicates
that large-degree nodes are preferentially connected with
other large-degree nodes, and disassortative if A < 0,
which denotes that links are more easily built between
large-degree nodes and small-degree ones. As demon-
strated in Ref [37], almost all social networks show pos-
itive values of A, while others, including technological
and biological networks, show negative A. However, the
mechanism that leads to the basic difference between
these two classes networks remains unclear [39]. We
calculate the assortative mixing coefficient A to check
whether the generated networks by our model are suit-
able representations of social systems. Figure 3 shows A
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FIG. 4: (color online). Cooperation density ρc as a function
of network size N for different W with fixing r in the top
panel and for different r with fixing W in the bottom panel.
as a function of parameter r for different values of W .
One can see that assortative behavior occurs as W in-
creases. For each value of W , A shows slight changes in
the cases of low values of r, while for large r, assorta-
tive mixing is enhanced with the same value of W . The
reported results demonstrate that the networks gener-
ated by our model can well capture the key distinguished
structural property of social networks.
B. Cooperation and wealth distribution
So far we have studied the evolution of the underly-
ing network structure influenced by the game. Next, we
turn to the effect of changing network structure on the
cooperative behavior in the game. The key quantity for
measuring the cooperation level of the game is the density
of cooperators, ρc [17]. Figure 4 shows the time series of
ρc for different values ofW and r. One can find that after
a short period of temporary behavior, ρc reaches a stable
value with small fluctuations around the average value.
Hence, ρc for each pair of W and r can be calculated by
averaging a period time after the system enter a steady
state. Here, the network size N is equal to the evolution-
ary time step, since each time an individual joins into
the system. In Fig. 5, we report the ρc depending on r
for different values of W . Each data point is obtained by
averaging over 10 different simulations with an average
from N = 5000 to 10000 for each simulation. One can
see in Fig. 5, in the case of r ≤ 0.4, ρc shows no dif-
ference for distinct r. While for r > 0.4, the lower the
value of r, the higher the cooperation level. It has been
known that scale-free networks favor the emergence and
persistence of cooperation [23]. Thus, the fact that ρc
in our model is larger than that of well-mixed cases is
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FIG. 5: (color online). Cooperator density ρc as a function
of payoff parameter r, for different W . Each data point is
obtained by averaging over 10 different simulations with an
average from N = 5000 to 10000 for each simulation.
attributed to the emergence of scale-free structural prop-
erties. At the very beginning, the network evolves from a
core of random-like structure, in which cooperation can-
not dominate in the game. While as the network gradu-
ally grows, power-law degree distribution emerges, which
leads to a sharp increase of ρc, as shown in Fig. 4 from
N = 0 to 500. The inhibited cooperation by the incre-
ment of W is also ascribed to the weakened heterogene-
ity of degree distribution. As displayed in Fig. 1, lower
value of W corresponds to stronger heterogeneity of de-
gree distribution reflected by the longer fat tail. The
above discussion gives a thorough picture that it is the
growth and the payoff-based preferential attachment that
produce scale-free network structures and meanwhile, the
generated heterogeneity of degree distribution effectively
promotes the emergence and persistence of cooperation.
Generally speaking, cooperation and defection are pro-
totypical actions in economical systems. Hence, evo-
lutionary games may be suitable paradigms for study-
ing and characterizing the phenomena observed in eco-
nomical systems with players represented by agents. In
such systems, a well-known and extensively studied phe-
nomenon is the wealth distribution of agents which fol-
lows the Pareto law in the high-income group [40, 41, 42].
In order to check the validity of our model for under-
standing economical behavior, we investigate the wealth
distribution by adopting the present evolutionary model,
where the wealth of an agent is naturally represented by
the accumulated payoff over time steps. Figure 6 reports
the accumulated distribution of accumulated payoff Pc
in the whole population for different model parameters r
and W . One can see that power-law distribution can be
observed in a wide range of Pc, while the wealth distri-
butions behave as exponential corrections in the zone of
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FIG. 6: (color online). Accumulated wealth distribution for
different W with fixing r in the left panel and for different
r with fixing W in the right panel. The so-called wealth Pc
is the accumulated payoff over times of each individual. The
results are obtained by averaging over 10 network realizations
when the network size N reaches 10000. The exponents of
the power-law distribution in the left panel for W = 0 and
W = 8 are 1.80 and 2.89, respectively. The empirical data of
USA and Japan are 1.6 and 1.8 − 2.2, respectively [41, 42].
Hence, the real observations can be reproduced by our model
by tuning the value of W .
low values of Pc, which is in accordance with the empir-
ical evidence. Moreover, in the left panel of Fig. 6, W
has strong influence on the exponent of power-law dis-
tribution and higher value of W corresponds to larger
exponent. In contrast, in the right panel, r nearly has
no effect on the wealth distribution. The correlation be-
tween W and the exponent of wealth distribution makes
our model general for reproducing the empirical observa-
tion.
C. Analysis
In the following, we provide some analysis for the scale-
free network structure induced by the payoff-preferential
attachment via considering the correlation between the
accumulated payoff Pc of individuals and their correspon-
dent degrees k. As shown in Fig. 7, Pc(k) is a good
linear function of k with slope depending on r in the
simulations. Using the mean-field approximation, a node
with degree k may have kρc cooperative neighbors and
k(1 − ρc) defectors and itself may be cooperator with
probability ρc and defector with 1 − ρc. Thus, at time
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FIG. 7: (color online). Correlation between the accumulated
payoff of each individual Pc(k) and its degree k for different
values of r. The results are obtained by averaging over 10
network realizations. Pc(k) shows a linear function of k. Sim-
ulation and analytical results of the normalized slope of each
line depending on r are displayed in the inset. The network
size N is 10000.
step t, its payoff can be calculated as
Mk(t) = ρc(t) · kρc(t) ·R
+ ρc(t) · k(1− ρc(t)) · S
+ (1− ρc(t)) · kρc(t) · T
+ (1− ρc(t)) · k(1− ρc(t)) · P (5)
By substituting the elements of payoff matrix of the SG
in Eq. (5), where R = 1, S = 1−r, T = 1+r and P = 0,
Eq. (5) is simplified to
Mk(t) = kρc(t)(2 − ρc(t)). (6)
Then, we get the accumulated payoff
Pc(k) =
∑
t
Mk(t)
= k
∑
t
ρc(t)(2 − ρc(t))
∝ kρc(2− ρc), (7)
where the approximation is ascribed to the fact that ρc(t)
quickly reaches a stable value which is almost indepen-
dent of t (as shown in Fig. 4), so that ρc(t) are replaced
by ρc for simplicity. The inset of Fig. 7 illustrates the
comparison between the simulation results and the an-
alytical ones on the the normalized slopes vs r. The
theoretical predictions are calculated by substituting the
simulation results of ρc (in Fig. 5) into Eq. (7). The
theoretical results are consistent with simulations.
Accordingly, considering the relation between the pay-
off Mi of an individual i and its degree ki in Eq. (6), we
6give the evolution equation of the degree of a given node
dki
dt
=
m(Mi +W )∑t
j=1(Mj +W )
=
m(kiρc(2− ρc) +W )
2mtρc(2− ρc) +Wt
=
ki +
W
mρc(2−ρc)
(2 + W
mρc(2−ρc)
)t
. (8)
Thus, we get ki(t) ∼ t
α with α = 1/(2 + W
mρc(2−ρc)
).
Then, in the infinite size, the degree probability distribu-
tion can be acquired by P (k) ∼
∫∞
0 δ(k − ki(t))dt ∼ k
−γ
with
γ = 1 + 1/a = 3 +
W
mρc(2− ρc)
. (9)
Though this expression is somewhat rough because of
several approximations, such as ρc ≈ ρc(t), t → ∞, Eq.
(9) can qualitatively describe the power-law degree dis-
tribution of the generated network.
In addition, we should mention a network model pro-
posed by Dorogovtsev and Mendes [43], which is related
to the present work. In such model, by introducing the
“initial attractiveness” (IA) to each node, power-law de-
gree distributions can be generated together with the ex-
ponent of the distribution controlled by strength of the
IA. Very interestingly, the IA plays a significant role in
the emergence of the assortative mixing property [44]. In
our model, the parameter W may play the same role as
that of the IA in the perspective of assortative feature.
The introduction of W enlarges the probability of poor
players being connected by the new one in the growth
process. Moreover, there is an approximately positive
correlation between the payoff and the degree of a given
individual. Hence, W enhances the connecting probabil-
ity between small-degree individuals that results in the
assortative mixing behavior. However, in our model, the
degree distribution is not only controlled by W and m,
but also by ρc, as obtained in Eq. (9). Our model couples
the dynamical process of the SG and the evolution of the
network, which leads to the difference between our model
and the network model of Dorogovtsev and Mendes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have studied the interplay of the evo-
lutionary game and the relevant network structure. Sim-
ulation results indicate that both scale-free structural
property and high cooperation level result from the inter-
play between the game and the network. Moreover, the
resultant networks reproduce some typical features of so-
cial networks, including small-world and positive assor-
tative mixing properties. The investigation of the wealth
distribution of players indicates the validity of our model
in mimicking the dynamical behavior of economical sys-
tems.
However, some issues still remain unclear and deserve
further study, such as the evolution of connections among
existing nodes, as discussed in previous works [39, 45, 46].
On the other hand, in the present work, we only consider
the case of “birth” of new players, which leads to the
growth of the network. While, in social systems, “death”
and “aging” are also important events and a previous
work has already pointed out that the aging effect plays
a significant role in the evolution of network structures
[47]. Therefore, there is a need to consider the death and
aging processes for better characterizing the evolutionary
dynamics of social systems in the future study.
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